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13 July 2005
The Hindu
America, India and
the outsourcing of imperial overreach
In offering to make India a 'major world power', Washington wants a 'low
cost ally' whose support in 'low-end tasks' will help free its own
military for the 'high-end' military operations central to maintaining
its power in Asia.
Siddharth Varadarajan
If there is one document everyone should read to understand the
direction relations between the United States and India have begun to
take in the past few years, it is The Indo-U.S. Military Relationship:
Expectations and Perceptions , a report commissioned by the Pentagon in
October 2002.
Written by Juli A. MacDonald of the
Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC) , a
Department of Defense-affiliated outfit, the 131-page report was based
on in-depth, off-the-record interviews with 40 senior serving U.S.
officials -- including military officers -- and around the same number
of serving and retired Indian officials and officers. The aim: to
"reveal the opportunities for and impediments to military-to-military
cooperation" between the two countries.
Although the unclassified report was circulated in the upper echelons of
government in both countries two years ago, its existence was never
publicised by either side -- presumably because of the frank manner in
which U.S. officials spoke of the value of India in America's emerging
Asian strategy. Reading the report two years later, it is clear the
Pentagon did not commission the study as an academic exercise. In 2002,
U.S. officials believed the opportunities were infinite and the
impediments relatively easy to overcome. Today, some of these
"opportunities" are being realized, as the
latest U.S.-India Defence Framework agreement suggests.
Anticipating the much-hyped naval cooperation between the U.S. and India
in the aftermath of the Tsunami, the IATAC report argues that the "
U.S. military seeks a competent military partner that can take on more
responsibility for low-end operations in Asia, such as peace-keeping
operations, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief
and high-value cargo escort, which will allow the U.S. military to
concentrate its resource on high-end fighting missions" (emphasis
added). The Pentagon's
Global Posture Review 2004 suggests the era of permanent large-scale
overseas deployment is over. Military action of the future requires
small bases, or "lily pads", and a network of close allies with
compatible "capabilities". This is where U.S. planners see India fitting
in.
The 'tethering' of China
What the Pentagon's planners want is a military alliance of the kind the
U.S. has with South Korea and Japan. The U.S. is looking ahead at the
next 50 years. Japan is a declining power and Korea an unpredictable
one. Alone in Asia, India offers the prospect of a power whose rise can
be harnessed in order to help the U.S. deal with the strategic challenge
of China. It helps that a section of the Indian economic and political
elite believes China is a threat.
So confident is Washington of the inevitability of this new alliance --
and of its utility on the China front -- that it has begun speaking of
India in the same breath as Japan and Korea. After
her speech at Tokyo's Sophia University on March 19 , U.S. Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice was asked about the challenge posed by China
to the U.S.
"[As] we look to
China's life", she replied, "I really do believe the U.S.-Japan
relationship, the U.S.-South Korean relationship, the U.S.-Indian
relationship, all are important in creating an environment in which
China is more likely to play a positive role than a negative role. These
alliances are not against China; they are alliances that are devoted to
a stable security and political and economic and, indeed, values-based
relationships that put China in the context of those relationships, and
a different path to development than if China were simply untethered,
simply operating without that strategic context." (emphasis added)
The
use of the word 'untethered' is not fortuitous. George F. Kennan had
just died and his intellectual legacy was weighing heavily on Dr Rice's
mind. 'To tether' means "to tie a rope or chain to an animal so as to
restrict him to a particular spot", precisely the aim Kennan hoped to
achieve by 'containment' of the Soviet Union.
In her report, Ms MacDonald noted that while the Indians she interviewed
were pre-occupied with "more immediate" challenges posed by China, "the
American interviewees are focused on the longer term implications of the
Chinese gaining a strategic position to threaten the U.S. position in
Asia". She stresses the reluctance of Indian and U.S. officials to
recommend or argue openly that the Indo-U.S. military relationship be
directed primarily against China. "A U.S. admiral reasoned that _$B!D_(B
[t]he U.S. and India both view China as a strategic threat _$B!D_(B
though we do not discuss this publicly". She quoted one American colonel
as warning against portraying India as a counter to China in U.S.
strategy: "_$B!D_(B Such a rationale for the relationship will make the
task of selling the Indo-U.S. relationship to the Indian public
exceedingly difficult." At the same time, China is the key. "This
statement is typical", the IATAC report says:
"As the U.S. military
engages India, as much as we say we do, we cannot separate our thinking
on India from our thinking on China. We want a friend in 2020 that will
be capable of assisting the U.S. military to deal with a Chinese threat.
We cannot deny that India will create a countervailing force to China."
India
as hedge
The American officials quoted in the IATAC report also said the U.S.
needs to prepare for the day its traditional relationships in Asia
weaken. A State Department official notes: "India's strategic importance
increases in the event that U.S. relationships with other traditional
allies (e.g. Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia) become more
acrimonious or politically uncomfortable for both parties; or if access
rights that the U.S. takes for granted become more restrictive_$B!D_(B
The U.S. needs to develop alternatives in Asia. India is the optimal
choice if we can overcome the obstacles in building the relationship."
Lack of access to U.S. weapons technology is seen as the biggest
obstacle from the Indian side. "An American major general summarized the
contrasting aims: 'The Indians will laud the relationship as a success
if they obtain the technology they want from the U.S. We will view the
relationship as a success if we are able to build a constructive
military cooperation program that enables us to jointly operate with the
Indians in the future'."
But these aims turn out not to be so contrasting after all. The sale of
U.S. technology will improve the "inter-operability" of Indian and U.S.
soldiers and allow for the kind of joint 'multinational operations' the
new U.S.-India defence agreement speaks of. "U.S. military officers who
want India to be a capable partner convey a uniform message: The US must
allow the sale of US technology and equipment to India", the IATAC
report states. According to a U.S. general, "The only way to achieve any
level of inter-operability requires the U.S. Government to sell India
U.S. equipment. Not only will [this] help the two militaries communicate
and operate together, they will also enable the U.S. military to more
equally assess India's military capabilities".
The aim, of course, is not just to assess but to access Indian military
capabilities. "Access to India would enable the U.S. military 'to be
able to touch the rest of the world' and to respond rapidly to regional
crises", one U.S. Lt General told Ms MacDonald. And another senior
officer argued that the U.S. Air Force "would benefit from having access
closer to areas of instability (e.g. Central Asia, Southeast Asia and
the Persian Gulf). India's well developed infrastructure could be useful
for U.S. power projection into these areas".
Indians who feel flattered by the growing number of port calls by U.S.
warships and joint exercises at sea and in air should realize there is a
purpose behind everything. "American military officers are "candid in
their plans to eventually seek access to Indian bases and military
infrastructure", the IATAC report states. "The U.S. Navy wants a
relatively neutral territory on the opposite side of the world that can
provide ports and support for operations in the Middle East", a U.S.
officer is quoted as saying. "Over time, port visits must become a
natural event_$B!D_(B In the same vein, the U.S. Air Force would like
the Indians to be able to grant them access to bases and landing rights
during operations, such as counter-terrorism and heavy airlift support."
"Our ultimate goal", another U.S. officer said, "is to be able to work
together with the Indians to respond to regional crises, particularly in
Africa. We (India and the U.S.) should be seen as partners in restoring
order and promoting democracy in the region".
If U.S. officials are candid about their expectations from India, they
are also aware of the need to tie India down early. A U.S. colonel told
Ms MacDonald: "The costs of building a relationship with India today are
significantly lower than the costs of facing India as a spoiler in the
future. Moreover, the costs of building a relationship with India will
likely increase over time". "Many Americans", she notes, "advocated that
'the low cost of building a relationship today will pay large dividends
in the future' by preventing India from acting in ways that could be
counter to U.S. interests."
In the process of helping the U.S. "tether" China, India is likely to
find that it has tethered itself as well. This is the essence of the
'offer'
a senior U.S. State Department official made in March this year to
"help India become a major world power". Such an offer is not only
demeaning, it is aimed at ensuring India never plays a constructive role
with China and others in developing a new, cooperative Asian security
framework -- a framework in which there is no room for outside powers to
maintain a military presence in the continent under the guise of
providing 'balance'.
If he has not already done so, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would be
well advised to go through the IATAC report before setting off for
Washington on March 16. Last week, he told reporters India would never
be a supplicant or client state. He is right. India is far too big --
and its people far too proud -- to allow this to happen. But as his
government rushes into a 'partnership' with the U.S. on all fronts --
especially military -- there must be no illusions about just what it is
Washington wants.
--
Siddharth Varadarajan
Deputy Editor
The Hindu
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